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Update docs/handbook/security.rst

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Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Jeffrey 'Alex' Clark 2026-04-14 20:08:05 -04:00
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@ -140,11 +140,12 @@ Denial of service
**D-1 — Decompression bomb**
A small compressed image can expand to gigabytes in memory.
:py:data:`PIL.Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS` (~89 MP by default) raises
:py:data:`PIL.Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS` raises
``DecompressionBombError`` at 2× the limit and
``DecompressionBombWarning`` at 1×. PNG text chunks are
separately capped by ``PngImagePlugin.MAX_TEXT_CHUNK`` (1 MiB) and
``MAX_TEXT_MEMORY`` (64 MiB).
separately capped by ``PngImagePlugin.MAX_TEXT_CHUNK`` and
``MAX_TEXT_MEMORY``. Check the values in your installed Pillow version at
runtime or in the reference/source for the current defaults.
*Mitigations:* **never** set ``Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = None`` in production;
treat ``DecompressionBombWarning`` as an error; set OS/container memory limits
@ -188,13 +189,12 @@ Opening an EPS file invokes the system Ghostscript binary (``gs``) via
``subprocess``. Ghostscript has a long history of sandbox-escape CVEs
permitting arbitrary code execution from malicious PostScript.
*Mitigations:* **block EPS files** at the application input layer; if EPS must
be supported, run Ghostscript in a fully isolated sandbox with no network and
no sensitive mounts; unregister the plugin if unused::
from PIL import Image, EpsImagePlugin
Image.OPEN.pop("EPS", None)
*Mitigations:* **block EPS files** at the application input layer before
passing files to Pillow; if EPS must be supported, run Ghostscript in a fully
isolated sandbox with no network and no sensitive mounts. Pillow does not
provide a stable public API for unregistering individual format plugins, so do
not rely on mutating internal registries such as ``Image.OPEN`` as a security
control.
**E-3 — ``ImageMath.unsafe_eval()`` code injection**
:py:meth:`~PIL.ImageMath.unsafe_eval` calls Python's built-in ``eval()`` with