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Update docs/handbook/security.rst

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Co-authored-by: Andrew Murray <3112309+radarhere@users.noreply.github.com>
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Jeffrey 'Alex' Clark 2026-04-22 07:34:40 -04:00
parent da06640873
commit 0cb00acc92
1 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Threat model (STRIDE)
---------------------
The analysis below follows the `STRIDE
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STRIDE_(security)>`_ framework and covers the
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STRIDE_model>`_ framework and covers the
boundary between untrusted image input and the Pillow API.
.. code-block:: text
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ boundary between untrusted image input and the Pillow API.
Untrusted zone │ Pillow API │
───────────── │ │
Image files ────►│ Image.open() ──► Format plugins │
Byte streams │ (40+ parsers) (Python + C FFI) │
Byte streams │ (40+ parsers) (Python + C FFI) │
User metadata │ │
│ ImageMath.unsafe_eval(expr) ───────────┼──► Python eval()
│ ImageShow.show(image) ─────────────────┼──► os.system / subprocess
@ -87,11 +87,11 @@ encode-decode cycle invisibly.
**T-3 — Supply chain tampering**
Pre-compiled wheels bundle libjpeg-turbo, libpng, libtiff, libwebp, openjpeg,
freetype, and littlecms2. A compromised PyPI release or build pipeline could
ship malicious binaries.
freetype, littlecms2, and other libraries. A compromised PyPI release or build pipeline
could ship malicious binaries.
*Mitigations:* pin with hash verification (``pip install --require-hashes``);
monitor `Pillow security advisories
*Mitigations:* pin with hash verification
(``python3 -m pip install --require-hashes``); monitor `Pillow security advisories
<https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories>`_; use
Dependabot or OSV-Scanner for bundled C library CVEs.